BY H.K. Dua
The US and Nato have finalized their plans to pull most of their troops out of Afghanistan, but no major player on the scene is certain that the strife-torn country will see peace and stability after the foreign troops have gone home.
Even if the US chooses to leave behind 10,000-odd troops, plus drones, behind, there is no guarantee that the Taliban, which it has been fighting for over a decade, will let peace prevail in Afghanistan until its aim to rule over the country has achieved.
Accounts filtering out of the contacts between the US and the Taliban in Turkey and the Gulf countries and those between President Hamid Karzai and the Taliban are hazy and do not promise a political settlement about a post-pull out dispensation.
The major supporter of the Taliban – Pakistan – which has been holding its cards close to itself has until recently been reluctant to be of help to the US mainly because the relations between Washington and Islamabad have remained strained after the US captured Osama bin Laden from his sanctuary in Abbotabad.
Judging from the latest statements made by Pakistan Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani after a meeting with Hillary Clinton relations between the two countries seem to be on the mend and there are indications that Pakistan may now agree to lend the US interlocutors some help to facilitate talks with the Taliban leaders, most of whom are in Quetta.
Hamid Karzai has been making his own efforts to have Pakistan on board and his recent meeting with President Asif Zardari has led to the release last week of Mullah Nooruddin Turabi, and the latest press reports emanating from Pakistan suggest that Mullah Baradar may also be released soon by Islamabad.
Whatever the quality of improvement of relations between the United States and Pakistan, and the promised release of Mullah Baradar as a confidence-building overture to Hamid Karzai, it is likely a transition from the present situation to a post-pull out Afghanistan is fraught with acute uncertainty.
It is mainly because the aims of all major players are different and apparently not reconcilable.
The end-game being played in Afghanistan may turn out to be less painful than the agony it suffered in US pull-out from Vietnam and to some extent in Iraq. This is notwithstanding the reality that the US has not accomplished all its tasks it wanted to in Afghanistan. President Barack Obama had in his first term made it clear that his future policy would aim at pulling the US troops out of Afghanistan. His decision to get out of Afghan engagement was clearly the outcome of the slowdown in the US economy and the growing unpopularity of the war being fought faraway in the mountainous terrain at the cost of nearly $ 3 trillion and enormous loss of lives of American soldiers.
In the second term, the Obama Administration has stepped up its efforts to secure a smooth and honourable exit from Afghanistan. His critics had faulted him for announcing much in advance the 2014-deadline for the pull-out. This was bound to make the Taliban more difficult to deal with. Hence, the US attempts to persuade Pakistan bring the Taliban leaders to the negotiating table for a political settlement of the conflict.
The Taliban has one aim: It wants to be a part of any future government in Kabul. Pakistan is also keen that a post-pull out government in Kabul should be headed by someone who is willing to do Islamabad’s bidding. Whatever, the public protestations Islamabad — certainly the Pakistan Army — has not given up the desire to acquire strategic depth in Afghanistan.
The US wants to evolve a political settlement in which all sections of the Afghan society are a party. Any settlement with the Taliban, which is mainly Pushtoon in composition, will not endure as those who were the members of the Northern alliance which have been backing the US drive against the Taliban, will not accept an accord reached only with the Taliban.
Presidednt Karzai who understands this problem of managing various sectional demands more than any other Afghan leader, is retiring by 2014 when the US troops will be leaving.
The post-pull out situation can lead to an outbreak of fresh hostilities familiar to Afghans. . The northern alliance at some stage might get revived and a civil war can break out which the 10,000-odd troops the Americans want to leave behind might not be able to prevent.
Although the Taliban is unlikely to give up its objective of gaining power in Kabul, the possibility of the Taliban establishing their hold on southern and south-western Afghanistan cannot be ruled out as soon as the US troops have left.
Not that this will lead to a division of Afghanistan as once predicted by Robert Blackwill, a former US Ambassador to India, a few years ago, the Afghans being essentially nationalistic in mind irrespective of varied ethnicity. However, the kind of peace Afghanistan badly needs for economic and social development will elude the country for quite some time.
Pakistan, has a price for helping the Americans who have lately shown understanding of its keenness to install a government convenient for Islamabad. It also wants the US, and British give an undertaking that they would accept the Durand Line as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan – a proposition that has been a sore point with the Pushtoons.
The Americans are keen that the Taliban agree to work within the framework of the new constitution, give up violence and not support Al Qaida. From Pakistan it wants a commitment that it will not allow safe havens for the terrorist groups on its territory from where they have been launching attacks into Afghanistan and on US troops.
The precarious state of Pakistan economy and the need for another tranche of money from the US and international agencies might compel it to be of help to the Americans arrive at a settlement with the Taliban.
On their part, Americans may ultimately pay that price, as they have always been doing, considering that they have generally considered Pakistan a front-line State – earlier against the Soviet Union and now against the Taliban and terrorism.
What if the Taliban – “Good Taliban”, as President Obama once innocently described, agree to these conditions now, but after sharing power in Kabul for some time return to the old ways ignoring all the commitments made. Also, Pakistan may not be able to prevent the use of safe havens even if it wants to be of help to the Americans.
History does not repeat itself every time a transition is attempted. But it could be going back to the drones Pakistan and the Taliban hate so bitterly. The year 2014 may not end up on a positive note for Afghanistan as being planned by the international chess-players. Endgames are generally difficult to play as Afghan history has proved in the past.
—Mr H K Dua is a senior journalist and now a Member of Parliament.