Afghanistan 2014 Transition can be messy

BY H.K. Dua  

The US and Nato have finalized their plans to pull most of their troops out of Afghanistan, but no major player on the scene is certain that the strife-torn country will see peace and stability after the foreign troops have gone home.

Even if the US chooses to leave behind 10,000-odd troops, plus drones, behind, there is no guarantee that the Taliban, which it has been fighting for over a decade, will let peace prevail in Afghanistan until its aim to rule over the country has achieved.

Accounts filtering out of the contacts between the US and the Taliban in Turkey and the Gulf countries and those between President Hamid Karzai and the Taliban are hazy and  do not promise  a political settlement about a post-pull out dispensation.

The major supporter of the Taliban – Pakistan – which has been holding its cards close to itself  has until recently been reluctant to be of help to the US mainly because the relations between Washington and Islamabad have remained strained after the US captured Osama bin Laden from his sanctuary in Abbotabad.

Judging from the latest statements made by Pakistan Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani after a meeting with Hillary Clinton relations between the two countries seem to be  on the mend and there are indications that Pakistan may now agree to lend the US interlocutors some help to facilitate talks with the Taliban leaders, most of whom are in Quetta.

Hamid Karzai has been making his own efforts to have Pakistan on board and his recent meeting with President  Asif Zardari has led to the release last week of Mullah Nooruddin Turabi, and the latest press reports emanating from Pakistan suggest that Mullah Baradar may also be released soon by Islamabad.

Whatever the quality of improvement of relations between the United States and Pakistan, and the promised release of Mullah Baradar as a confidence-building overture to Hamid Karzai, it is likely a transition from the present situation to a post-pull out Afghanistan is fraught with acute uncertainty.

It is mainly because the aims of all major players are different and apparently not reconcilable.
The end-game being played in Afghanistan may turn out to be less painful than  the agony it suffered in US pull-out from Vietnam and to some extent  in Iraq.  This is notwithstanding the reality that the US has not accomplished all its tasks it wanted to in Afghanistan. President Barack Obama had in his first term made it clear that his future policy would aim at pulling the US troops out of Afghanistan.  His decision to get out of Afghan engagement was clearly the outcome of the slowdown in the US economy and the growing unpopularity of the war being fought faraway in the mountainous terrain at the cost of nearly $ 3 trillion and enormous loss of lives of American soldiers.

In the second term, the Obama Administration has stepped up its efforts to secure a smooth and honourable exit from Afghanistan. His critics had faulted him for announcing much in advance the 2014-deadline for the pull-out. This was bound to make the Taliban more difficult to deal with. Hence, the US attempts to persuade Pakistan bring the Taliban leaders  to the negotiating table for a political settlement of the conflict.

The Taliban has one aim: It wants to be a part of any future government in Kabul. Pakistan is also keen that a post-pull out government  in Kabul should be headed by someone who is willing to do Islamabad’s bidding. Whatever, the  public protestations Islamabad —  certainly  the Pakistan Army — has not given up the desire to acquire strategic depth in Afghanistan.

The US  wants to evolve a political settlement in which all sections of the Afghan society are a party.  Any settlement with the Taliban, which is mainly Pushtoon  in composition, will not endure as those who were the members of the Northern alliance which have been backing the US drive against the Taliban, will not accept an accord reached only with the Taliban.

Presidednt  Karzai who understands this problem of  managing various sectional demands more than any other Afghan leader, is retiring by 2014 when the  US troops will be leaving.

The post-pull out situation can lead to an outbreak of fresh hostilities familiar to Afghans. . The northern alliance at some stage might get revived and a civil war can break out which the 10,000-odd troops the Americans want to leave behind might not be able  to prevent.

Although the Taliban is unlikely to give up its objective of gaining power in Kabul, the  possibility of the Taliban establishing their  hold on southern and south-western Afghanistan cannot be ruled out as soon as the US troops have left.

Not that this will lead to a division of Afghanistan as once predicted by Robert Blackwill, a former US Ambassador to India, a few years ago, the Afghans being essentially nationalistic in mind irrespective of  varied ethnicity. However, the kind of peace Afghanistan badly needs for economic and social development will elude the country for quite some time.

Pakistan, has a price for helping the Americans who have lately shown understanding of its keenness to install a government convenient for Islamabad. It also wants the US, and British give an undertaking that they would accept the Durand Line as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan – a proposition that has been a sore point with the Pushtoons.

The Americans are keen that the Taliban agree to work within the framework of the new constitution, give up violence and not support Al Qaida. From Pakistan it wants a commitment that it will not allow  safe havens for the terrorist groups on its territory from where they have been launching attacks into Afghanistan and on US  troops.

The precarious state of Pakistan economy and the need for another tranche of money from the US and international agencies might compel it to be of help to the Americans arrive at a settlement with the Taliban.

On their part, Americans may ultimately pay that price, as they have always been doing, considering that they have generally  considered Pakistan a front-line State – earlier against the Soviet Union and now against the Taliban and terrorism.

What if the Taliban – “Good Taliban”, as President Obama once innocently described, agree to these conditions now, but after sharing power in Kabul for some time return to the old ways ignoring all the commitments made. Also, Pakistan  may not be able to prevent the use of safe havens even if it wants to be of help to the Americans.

History does not repeat itself every time a transition is attempted. But it could be going back to the drones Pakistan and the Taliban hate so bitterly. The year 2014 may not end up on a positive note for Afghanistan as being planned by the international chess-players. Endgames are generally difficult to play as Afghan history has proved in the past.

—Mr H K Dua is a  senior journalist   and now a Member of Parliament.

 

Terrorists attack Pak naval base

Pakistan

Jihadis and N-weapons, an explosive mix

 Options for Kiyani

Published in Asian Age,  By H.K. Dua

If there is a fire next door, neighbours are bound to get worried. The latest terrorist attack at a major naval station near Karachi may have been frustrated by the government forces but the crisis in Pakistan is much more serious than the events of the last two days portray.

It should worry India, other countries in the region, the United States and other world powers. Untackled, it can engulf  the subcontinent, the US and other countries who would not know how to handle Pakistan erupting.

Pakistan is sitting on an explosive mix of jihadism, terrorism of varied hues and a militarist hubris born out of nuclear weapons it has piled up during the last few years.

India can legitimately tell Pakistan that the present situation is the outcome of the past mistakes like excessive reliance on military for building a nation state and using terrorist groups as an aid to policy towards India in the east and Afghanistan in its north-west. It will. however, be politically incorrect for Indians to indulge in “we-told-you-so” attitude, even if India has been victim of terrorism exported by Pakistan.

The US has been unpopular in Pakistan for some years by now. The killing of Osama Bin-Laden in Abbotabad just a few miles from Islamabad earlier this month has shown the Pakistan Army lose face with the people. The attack on Karachi Naval Base, which is actually a joint establishment of the Pakistan Army, the Air Force and the Navy, has sharply brought out how the Pakistani military establishment has failed to tackle threats from terrorist groups who can spring a surprise and attack even a highly protected base.

The civil authorities at the federal headquarters or in the provinces are too weak to protect Pakistan from terrorist groups. This was evident when Pakistan’s parliament failed even to condemn when Punjab Governor Salman Taseer was killed by his guard for criticizing the blasphemy laws forced upon Pakistan by the jihadi groups. Even Gen. Ashfaque Pervez Kiyani did not condemn the jihadi groups for endorsing Salman Taseer’s murder.

More important is the fear that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons can be captured by the jihadi groups who can blackmail the world, pushing it towards a bigger conflagration.

A  serious possibility can also be visualized  of the breaking- up of Pakistan as a nation. And splintering of the country  can lead to more turmoil and no one in Delhi or elsewhere in the world would really  know how to handle the fragments.

The scenario of a Pakistan broken into pieces can be more grim for India and the world than  Pakistan as  one country has been, even if it has been a problem nation for India and the rest of the world. India has no solution for Pakistan’s problems, endemic or otherwise; nevertheless, gloating over its troubles as some people are prone to, is not warranted. What is needed is cool reflection and working out different policy options to tackle contingencies.

It is not only India that should worry about the present situation acquiring a critical mass. Responsible powers of the world – the USA, Europe, Russia and nations in Pakistan’s  neighbourhood, would need to get into consultations at different levels to take a view of the developing situation in Pakistan.

Even the Chinese , who have sought to restore Pakistan’s shattered morale after what happened at Abbotabad, would need to ponder the possibility of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the hands of jihadi groups and also about Pakistan splintering into small states.

In Pakistan itself a large number of people are deeply worried these days about the present and the future of their country. Among the Pakistan Army top brass also there could be a few generals who would know the dangers that have arisen for the state of Pakistan partly because of dalliance between the Army and the jihadi groups which it used for several years for foreign policy purposes as well as for keeping a check on the rise of the  democratic forces.

On the other hand, there could also be elements in the Pakistan Army who were recruited by Zia-ul-Haq to inject Islamist  ideology into the Pakistan Army. Some of these officers may have been weeded out, but there could be others who would have by now become senior officers working in concert with jhihadi groups.  General Kiyani would be knowing who these officers are and  how a mutually-accommodative relationship with the jihadi groups has brought Pakistan to this pass.

General Kiyani certainly cannot be comfortable with the image his army is having in his country and in the rest of the world after Abbotabad.

He has had also to see the ignominy of his ISI chief appear before parliament and explain why the army could not detect the US marine helicopters attacking Osama’s house in Abbotabad. Men in uniform in Pakistan are not used to appearing before the civilians who are always the object of sneers in army messes..

The Karachi attack has been another blow. Hence his need to take steps to retrieve the lost image. How he goes about it remains to be seen.

Theoretically, there are many options:

He can be funny with the Americans on the Afghanistan border; or indulge in adventurism on eastern borders with India. Both these are risky propositions; hence, unlikely.

He could also stage a coup, send civilians back home and grab absolute power under the plea that only the Army can save Pakistan.

The best option for him, however,  is to cut the terrorists’ umbilical cord and strike at the jihadi groups in Pakistan. This way perhaps he can save Pakistan from descending into chaos.

Whether he chooses this course or follows another remains to be seen.

 

  • The writer is a senior journalist and now

Member of Parliament.