Making peace with Pakistan – II

Making peace with Pakistan – II
Crushing terrorism is crucial for progress
by H.K. Dua, who was lately in Pakistan

AT his news conference after his talks with Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee, President Musharraf looked relaxed, somewhat exuberant, over the outcome of the meeting which he described as “historic” at one stage and “a leap forward” at another. There could be hyperbole involved in this, but it was too clear from his body language and what he said in his answers that at the end of the day he was feeling considerably relieved.

The hosting of SAARC and a meeting with the Prime Minister of India has given him a sort of legitimacy he had been looking for after the coup in which he had grabbed power from Mr Nawaz Sharif. International legitimacy, like charity, begins nearer home. The denial of a dialogue always amounted to India not acknowledging that he was Pakistan’s leader with whom it could discuss peace and normalisation of relations. The Kargil war and the fiasco at the Agra Summit had indeed created a credibility problem for the General and this he had been trying to overcome for some time.

Significantly, this is the first time India has agreed to come to a sort of agreement with Pakistan’s Army and not a democratic government headed by a political leader. The Simla Agreement was signed with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the Lahore Declaration with Mr Nawaz Sharif. Bhutto went back on the Simla Agreement and was later executed by the Zia regime. The Lahore Declaration was rejected by the Army and General Musharraf. The Kargil operation was launched on the sly and Mr Nawaz Sharif was sent into exile. Apparently, the General has sought to convey that it is better for India to deal with Pakistan’s Army, which in effect has been ruling the country for most of the time since it was created 56 years ago – and not with the politicians’ governments that have been coming and going out of office. The referendum and the general election which he had organised and won are the implied arguments for getting a mandate and legitimacy at home.

Incidentally, there is no mention of the Simla Agreement or the Lahore Declaration in the joint statement issued after the Islamabad talks earlier this week. This is unlike previous occasions when India always insisted on a reference to the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration. It could be that the two leaders have agreed to discuss the Indo-Pakistan problems in future within a new and unspelt framework. For India’s comfort there is no mention either of the UN resolutions which Pakistan used to insist upon earlier, despite the fact that plenty of water has gone down the Jhelum during the last five decades and the resolutions have become dated and irrelevant to the present situation and the continuing argument on Kashmir.

President Musharraf had recently said in an on-the-record interview with Reuters that Pakistan would not insist on UN resolutions, but his Foreign Minister, Mr Khurshid Kasuri, and later Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali said the President was quoted out of context.

General Musharraf, who also holds the post of Chief of Army Staff, said a few days ago that he would give up his uniform by the end of the year. The statement was perhaps made in the domestic context. But he could also be conveying to the world that he intended to rule Pakistan as an elected ruler and not as the Chief Army Staff. He was also sending out the signal that the Army top brass would remain united behind him even after he gave up the Army job and retained only Presidentship. Hopefully, he is right and remains confident to put into effect the assurances he has given to Mr Vajpayee at Islamabad.

The key assurance given to India is that he will not allow terrorists to use territory “controlled” by it. This means his commitment applies to Pakistan Occupied Kashmir also. The provision in the Islamabad statement – considered important by India – can certainly be interpreted as Pakistan agreeing to dismantle terrorists’ training camps that had proliferated in Pakistan and PoK as well as the communication networks set up for them to facilitate their cross-border activities against India.

“No extremism will be allowed in Pakistan”, President Musharraf said at his news conference. When asked about how extremists groups would react to the peace moves being made through talks with India, President Musharraf said he intended to deal with them sternly. “We must negotiate strongly and deal with extremists strongly”, he said to assure India. “We will adopt more measures to curb religious extremism”.

Militant Islamists in Pakistan turned against President Musharraf soon after he decided to support the United States’ fight against terrorism. But he, while giving help to the Americans in fighting Al Qaida, adopted a different policy on Pakistan’s borders with India. Despite post-Nine Eleven developments, Pakistan went on calling the terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir “freedom fighters”. And despite commitments to the contrary, Pakistan went on supporting terrorist groups as a policy to extract concessions from India on Kashmir.

President Musharraf seems to be changing tack and trying to give up this two-faced policy on terrorism and in the process meeting India’s demand that a dialogue could begin only if Pakistan gave up the path of “jihad” and terrorism.

Of significance is the statement by Mr Brajesh Mishra, Prime Minister’s Principal Secretary, who flew to Islamabad for behind-the-scene negotiations with Mr Tariq Aziz, President Musharraf’s Chief of Staff, saying that the two countries would jointly fight terrorism. As Pakistan has realised that terrorists are nobody’s friends, cooperation in anti-terrorism operation can be more effective and create a kind of trust all well-meaning neighbours should have in each other. This kind of cooperation is necessary but how it will work is not known. May be it is yet to be worked out by the two sides.

Actually, terrorism has become a threat to President Musharraf himself, as is evident from the two serious attempts that were recently made on his life not far from his official residence in Rawalpindi and the General Headquarters of the Army, which in effect is the seat of power in Pakistan.

“I have nine lives”, said the President at his news conference to assure the audience that he was in a position to deal with the extremists and ensure stability in Pakistan.

Apparently, President Musharraf has realised that some of the terrorists Pakistan was encouraging all these years to harass India in Jammu and Kashmir have become fairly autonomous and have joined hands with Al Qaida which after Nine Eleven had turned against President Musharraf. The two kinds of terrorists, those on the western borders and those closer to the Line of Control on the eastern side, can together pose a serious threat to Pakistan. This nexus between the two might be persuading him to turn against them.

India would certainly like President Musharraf’s promised fight against extremists to succeed. And his success in crushing terrorism will determine the progress and quality of the “composite dialogue” the two countries have agreed to embark on to resolve all outstanding issues, including Kashmir, which remains the toughest nut to crack.

 

Making peace with Pakistan-I

Making peace with Pakistan-I
Islamabad meeting shows the way
by H. K. Dua, who was lately in Pakistan

THERE is a great deal to be said for the summit-level meeting between leaders of India and Pakistan in Islamabad last week.
Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and President Pervez Musharraf at last decided to experiment with a bit of history and place the two countries on a track which, if pursued with care and political will, can lead to peace in the subcontinent.
Apparently, some exchanges had taken place during the last few weeks between the two governments, but till the last minute there was trepidations on both sides how the two leaders, who had viewed each other with considerable suspicion, would react to each other and work out something that could bring to an end a history of hatred, bitterness, three wars, Kargil and nearly two decades of terrorism and violence.
Their labours in Islamabad were fruitful, much to the relief of the people of the two countries.
The two leaders’ own instincts, perhaps, the fatigue a long strife-torn relationship can bring about among people or the sheer force of circumstances and realities on the ground, and international pressures had all together led them to agree that Pakistan will not allow the territory under its control to be used by terrorists and India will accept talks on Jammu and Kashmir, as part of a composite dialogue which would begin next month.
That something could come out of the meeting was perhaps the assessment before Mr Vajpayee decided to board the plane for Pakistan. He had an easy excuse for not going to Islamabad. Two serious attempts had been made on President Musharraf’s life only a few days earlier in the vicinity of his official residence in Rawalpindi. It was clear that spoilers were at work to assassinate the Pakistani President.
Many in the Vajpayee government and the country were worried whether the Prime Minister should at all go to Islamabad and land himself in a situation where its own President’s life was in serious danger. Even Mr George Bush or any other world leader would have called off a visit were he to go to Islamabad in a similar situation.
That Mr Vajpayee insisted on going to Pakistan, despite advice to the contrary, shows that he was keen to pursue his peace-with-Pakistan project irrespective of the uncertainties. May be, behind-the-scene contacts had thrown up some possibilities of reaching an accord with Pakistan and he did not want to miss these. Already, he had begun saying that this could be his last attempt to make peace with Pakistan.
Possibly, the emotion and thought Mr Vajpayee had invested on his peace project and the ups and downs it had already gone through during the last few years had made him impatient for results. He could also be worried that India would soon get busy with elections and picking up the thread afterwards would take a long time.
The assessment of the Prime Minister and his key advisers, although it remained tentative until the last, must have been that despite a difficult situation, it was better he flew to Islamabad to attend the SAARC Summit and meet General Musharraf and see whether the two could set into motion a process that ultimately would abolish war from the subcontinent.
Also, it would have been imprudent to let President Musharraf down by not going to Islamabad and meeting him. After all, he had been responding positively to the peace moves India had been making since Mr Vajpayee gave a call in Srinagar in April last year for peaceful and tension-free relationship between the two countries.
The unilateral and unconditional ceasefire Pakistan had announced all along the Line of Control, the reduction in infiltration from Pakistan, the resumption of flights, and the agreements on bus and train services were the signs that tended to build some confidence in President Musharraf’s intentions and wash off the bitter memories of the Agra Summit over two years ago.
The international opinion also favoured a Vajpayee-Musharraf meeting on the sidelines of the Saarc Summit. Not going to Islamabad would have earned India a bad image all over the world. Also, by going to Islamabad, the General would be spared of what would have definitely been regarded as a snub. It would also mean missing the opportunities that may be there to be availed of.
Whichever way the meeting may be described, its outcome has been received with a sense of great relief on both sides of the subcontinental divide, among the Saarc countries and in the rest of the world. The way congratulatory messages have poured in from President George W. Bush, Prime Minister Tony Blair, President Putin and leaders of China and the European Union shows how worried they had been about the continuing deadlock between India and Pakistan.
It would be presumptuous to say that the Vajpayee-Musharraf meeting has sorted out all the problems that have caused hatred and wars on the subcontinent all these years. The joint press statement that was issued at the end of the talks has tried to meet immediate concerns of the two nations, given a momentum to normalisation of their relationship and put them on track for securing a durable peace on the subcontinent.
Essentially, the joint statement, which required fine-tuning and meeting core demands of both sides until the last moment, commits President Musharraf to ensure that he “will not permit any territory under Pakistan’s control to be used to support terrorism in any manner”.
Pakistan’s gain out of the exercise is that India has agreed to “a composite dialogue” to begin in February 2004. “The two leaders”, according to the joint statement, “are confident that the resumption of the composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides”.
India is happy as it has at last got the commitment from President Musharraf that Pakistan will not encourage cross-border terrorism, nor allow the territory under its control to be used by terrorists.
Pakistan is happy that it has made India accept its demand for a discussion on Jammu and Kashmir as a part of “the composite dialogue” and that these talks will begin as early as next month.
Whether some private assurances have been given by both sides to each other is not known, but the joint statement does not provide for a framework or a deadline for the composite dialogue on all issues, including Jammu and Kashmir. The level at which these talks are to begin is yet to be worked out by the two countries.
Essentially, the two leaders have agreed that “the constructive dialogue would promote progress towards the common objective of peace, security and economic development for our peoples and for future generations”. This could be a general proposition, but it seems the two nations have come to the conclusion that it is better to work for peace and normalise relations than live in an atmosphere of distrust, hatred and violence.
How far the two countries are able to travel along this track remains to be seen.
(To be continued)