Between war and peace

Between war and peace
For Sri Lanka it’s a long trek
by H.K.Dua, who was recently in Colombo

There is neither war nor peace in Sri Lanka. It is a peculiar situation which leaves somewhat an uncomfortable feeling. Tired of 21 years of conflict and ethnic killings, this island nation is caught in agonising uncertainty, with Sri Lankans hoping that there will be peace in their lifetime and the LTTE’s men in the north continuing to work for a separate Eelam.

There is a sort of ceasefire between the Sri Lankan army and the LTTE, but much remains to be done before a ceasefire can become peace and the nation can breathe easily.

I was recently in Colombo to attend a meeting of the Jury of the South Asian Prize for Tolerance – a value that has eluded much of South Asia and certainly Sri Lanka. The Jury’s meeting gave me an opportunity to meet a wide spectrum of people – their new Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, Opposition leaders, the General Secretary of the Left-wing JVP (now a coalition partner) and others who are chipping in with their effort to peace-making in Sri Lanka. President Chandrika Kumaratunga was away to Britain, presumably to meet her children.

Mrs Kumaratunga, whose family has ruled Sri Lanka for several years since the country became free over five decades ago, perhaps thinks that she alone among the present lot of leaders in Sri Lanka can establish peace, ensuring at the same time that the Island Republic would remain one country.

Mrs Kumaratunga has already ruled Sri Lanka for 10 years and has got just two years left of her second term to accomplish what she believes is her mission. Under the Sri Lankan constitution a President cannot have a third term. Mrs Kumaratunga, 62, is not one of those who may be inclined to calling it a day. There is open talk in Colombo’s political circles — and they are good at both analysis and sifting logic from facts and gossip — that she will get the constitution amended to get another term of six years, or go in for a new constituent assembly to have a parliamentary form of government which can give her a chance to rule Sri Lanka as Prime Minister, if not as its executive President.

There can be problems on the way if she follows this track to remain in power longer than warranted under the present constitution. Mrs Kumaratunga’s alliance does not have a two-thirds majority in Parliament to permit a constitutional amendment or to set up a convenient constituent assembly.

Given the arithmetic thrown up by recent parliamentary elections, Mrs Kumaratunga cannot get the constitution amended or a new constituent assembly set up without the cooperation of opposition leader Ranil Wickremsinghe. They have had continuously acrimonious relations until the elections and it is inconceivable at present that they can easily overcome bitterness and join hands to work together to build a new Sri Lanka.

And why should Mr Wickremsinghe, who is much younger to Mrs Kumaratunga, sacrifice his own ambitions to help his main adversary rule Sri Lanka again – and at his own cost? In Colombo, like in most capitals of the world, no one rules out new permutations and combinations of political forces, however. Where cohabitation did not work in the last Parliament, realignment of the SLFP and the UNP men might become necessary one day. Today’s foes can become tomorrow’s friends one day.

Time is not the only hurdle in Mrs Kumaratunga’s search for peace – although she was totally opposed to Mr Ranil Wickremsinghe’s softness towards the LTTE’s demands. Mrs Kumaratunga’s party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, in fact, fought last April’s parliamentary elections on the platform that Mr Wickremsinghe as Prime Minister was giving too many concessions to the LTTE and this in the long run could lead to the creation of a separate State – a Tamil Eelam.

Having defeated Mr Wickremsinghe’s UNP at the parliamentary polls -with the help of the extreme left-wing party JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna) – Mrs Kumaratunga is perhaps keen to make it known to the world, particularly the West, that she is no less ardent a peace-seeker than was Mr Ranil Wickremsinghe.

While the ceasefire between the Sri Lankan Army and the LTTE has several ups and downs, the peace process, which had been initiated by the Norwegians, remains stalled. The current effort is to get the peace process started again before it gets too late.

The Norwegians, who have established enough credentials with both the Colombo establishment as well as with the LTTE in the north, are back in the game, although one of their ministers who visited Colombo recently described the situation, although a little despondently, as “a frozen war”. A senior UNP functionary said the current phase was not peace, but “a proxy war.”

A formidable block before the resumption of peace negotiations is the LTTE’s demand that there must be an Interim Self-Government Authority (ISGA) through which the Tamils can run their own administration in the northern and eastern provinces without any interference by the Sri Lanka government.

For the opposition UNP, it is not a serious hurdle. In the government and the ruling alliance headed by Mrs Kumaratunga, opinions vary. While Mrs Kumaratunga and advisers may be thinking that definitional concerns about what the ISGA would ultimately not stand in the way of a dialogue getting started, her partner in the alliance, the JVP, which represents hardline Sinhala opinion widely prevalent in the South, is opposed to the ISGA, which, it is sure, would be a first step towards the creation of an Eelam.

The JVP, which has won an amazing 39 seats out of 220 in Parliament and 80 out of 83 seats in local elections has emerged as a powerful group in the ruling UPFA and cannot be easily ignored by Mrs Kumaratunga.

While there are indications that it would like to avoid the fall of the UPFA government led by Mrs Kumaratunga’s nominee, Mr Mohindra Rajpakse, as of now there is no sign that the JVP would give up its opposition to the LTTE’s demand for the ISGA. Interestingly, the UNP has, for effect or otherwise, made it known that the opposition UNP would support the government if the JVP tries to scuttle the resumption of talks with the LTTE over the ISGA.

The distrust between the government and the LTTE is another hurdle yet to be crossed. What has deepened it is the recent defection of Karuna, one of Prabhakaran’s senior commanders, who broke ranks with the LTTE leader. Karuna’s revolt, although crushed by Parabhakaran’s men, has seriously dented the LTTE supremo’s image and the claim that he alone is the representative of the Tamils.

Notwithstanding impediments, there are indications that peace-makers are engaged in back channel diplomacy to place the derailed peace dialogue back on the track, even if the actual resolution of the Sri Lanka’s ethnic crisis remains a distant proposition.

Efforts seem to be on to see that Colombo’s as well as the LTTE’s representatives meet in Oslo under the Norwegians’ auspices, say in October or November. Crucial will, however, be a meeting of the Tamil diaspora in Geneva next month after which the LTTE’s position will be known.

Interestingly, all parties in Sri Lanka want India to play a role in the peace process. Essentially, both the ruling UPFA and the UNP want India to put pressure on the LTTE to ensure that it comes to the negotiating table in a more reasonable frame of mind.

India is opposed to again getting sucked into the Sri Lankan mess, having already burnt its fingers in 1987, when on Jayawardene’s plea it rushed the IPKF to the North. It was a decision India was to regret later.

Also, for India, the LTTE remains a banned terrorist organisation and its demand for Prabhakaran’s extradition still remains a serious concern for South Block. And rightly so, after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi.

India would like to see peace in the strife-torn nation restored and aspirations of Tamils and other communities met, but New Delhi is unlikely to be sanguine about the setting up of the ISGA demanded by the LTTE. New Delhi cannot relish the creation of an entity which has the makings of an Eelam next to its coastline.

New Delhi’s primary concern is to see that Sri Lanka remains a united country.

(To be concluded)

Making peace with Pakistan – II

Making peace with Pakistan – II
Crushing terrorism is crucial for progress
by H.K. Dua, who was lately in Pakistan

AT his news conference after his talks with Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee, President Musharraf looked relaxed, somewhat exuberant, over the outcome of the meeting which he described as “historic” at one stage and “a leap forward” at another. There could be hyperbole involved in this, but it was too clear from his body language and what he said in his answers that at the end of the day he was feeling considerably relieved.

The hosting of SAARC and a meeting with the Prime Minister of India has given him a sort of legitimacy he had been looking for after the coup in which he had grabbed power from Mr Nawaz Sharif. International legitimacy, like charity, begins nearer home. The denial of a dialogue always amounted to India not acknowledging that he was Pakistan’s leader with whom it could discuss peace and normalisation of relations. The Kargil war and the fiasco at the Agra Summit had indeed created a credibility problem for the General and this he had been trying to overcome for some time.

Significantly, this is the first time India has agreed to come to a sort of agreement with Pakistan’s Army and not a democratic government headed by a political leader. The Simla Agreement was signed with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the Lahore Declaration with Mr Nawaz Sharif. Bhutto went back on the Simla Agreement and was later executed by the Zia regime. The Lahore Declaration was rejected by the Army and General Musharraf. The Kargil operation was launched on the sly and Mr Nawaz Sharif was sent into exile. Apparently, the General has sought to convey that it is better for India to deal with Pakistan’s Army, which in effect has been ruling the country for most of the time since it was created 56 years ago – and not with the politicians’ governments that have been coming and going out of office. The referendum and the general election which he had organised and won are the implied arguments for getting a mandate and legitimacy at home.

Incidentally, there is no mention of the Simla Agreement or the Lahore Declaration in the joint statement issued after the Islamabad talks earlier this week. This is unlike previous occasions when India always insisted on a reference to the Simla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration. It could be that the two leaders have agreed to discuss the Indo-Pakistan problems in future within a new and unspelt framework. For India’s comfort there is no mention either of the UN resolutions which Pakistan used to insist upon earlier, despite the fact that plenty of water has gone down the Jhelum during the last five decades and the resolutions have become dated and irrelevant to the present situation and the continuing argument on Kashmir.

President Musharraf had recently said in an on-the-record interview with Reuters that Pakistan would not insist on UN resolutions, but his Foreign Minister, Mr Khurshid Kasuri, and later Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali said the President was quoted out of context.

General Musharraf, who also holds the post of Chief of Army Staff, said a few days ago that he would give up his uniform by the end of the year. The statement was perhaps made in the domestic context. But he could also be conveying to the world that he intended to rule Pakistan as an elected ruler and not as the Chief Army Staff. He was also sending out the signal that the Army top brass would remain united behind him even after he gave up the Army job and retained only Presidentship. Hopefully, he is right and remains confident to put into effect the assurances he has given to Mr Vajpayee at Islamabad.

The key assurance given to India is that he will not allow terrorists to use territory “controlled” by it. This means his commitment applies to Pakistan Occupied Kashmir also. The provision in the Islamabad statement – considered important by India – can certainly be interpreted as Pakistan agreeing to dismantle terrorists’ training camps that had proliferated in Pakistan and PoK as well as the communication networks set up for them to facilitate their cross-border activities against India.

“No extremism will be allowed in Pakistan”, President Musharraf said at his news conference. When asked about how extremists groups would react to the peace moves being made through talks with India, President Musharraf said he intended to deal with them sternly. “We must negotiate strongly and deal with extremists strongly”, he said to assure India. “We will adopt more measures to curb religious extremism”.

Militant Islamists in Pakistan turned against President Musharraf soon after he decided to support the United States’ fight against terrorism. But he, while giving help to the Americans in fighting Al Qaida, adopted a different policy on Pakistan’s borders with India. Despite post-Nine Eleven developments, Pakistan went on calling the terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir “freedom fighters”. And despite commitments to the contrary, Pakistan went on supporting terrorist groups as a policy to extract concessions from India on Kashmir.

President Musharraf seems to be changing tack and trying to give up this two-faced policy on terrorism and in the process meeting India’s demand that a dialogue could begin only if Pakistan gave up the path of “jihad” and terrorism.

Of significance is the statement by Mr Brajesh Mishra, Prime Minister’s Principal Secretary, who flew to Islamabad for behind-the-scene negotiations with Mr Tariq Aziz, President Musharraf’s Chief of Staff, saying that the two countries would jointly fight terrorism. As Pakistan has realised that terrorists are nobody’s friends, cooperation in anti-terrorism operation can be more effective and create a kind of trust all well-meaning neighbours should have in each other. This kind of cooperation is necessary but how it will work is not known. May be it is yet to be worked out by the two sides.

Actually, terrorism has become a threat to President Musharraf himself, as is evident from the two serious attempts that were recently made on his life not far from his official residence in Rawalpindi and the General Headquarters of the Army, which in effect is the seat of power in Pakistan.

“I have nine lives”, said the President at his news conference to assure the audience that he was in a position to deal with the extremists and ensure stability in Pakistan.

Apparently, President Musharraf has realised that some of the terrorists Pakistan was encouraging all these years to harass India in Jammu and Kashmir have become fairly autonomous and have joined hands with Al Qaida which after Nine Eleven had turned against President Musharraf. The two kinds of terrorists, those on the western borders and those closer to the Line of Control on the eastern side, can together pose a serious threat to Pakistan. This nexus between the two might be persuading him to turn against them.

India would certainly like President Musharraf’s promised fight against extremists to succeed. And his success in crushing terrorism will determine the progress and quality of the “composite dialogue” the two countries have agreed to embark on to resolve all outstanding issues, including Kashmir, which remains the toughest nut to crack.